Agents read your secrets. Nothing wrote it down.
For compliance and security — which agents touched sensitive data, and how.
Agents open credential stores, dotenv files, and source code as part of doing their work. Today that access leaves no record — no path, no agent, no count, and certainly no owner to ask about it.
Sensitive access, unrecorded.
When an agent reads a secret, you find out during the incident — not before, and not from your own logs.
No record of the read
Which path, by which agent, how many times — none of it is captured where your security team can see it.
Egress hides in plain sight
An agent that reads far more than it writes is likely moving data out. Without read/write asymmetry, that pattern is invisible.
No owner attached
Even when you spot risky access, there's no name behind the agent to answer for it.
The movement, without the content.
Inventory sensitive access
Every secret, credential, ssh, and shell-history path an agent touched, grouped by category and severity.
Flag the asymmetry
Read-heavy agents stand out, so likely data egress is surfaced as a pattern instead of a surprise.
Attach the owner
Each exposure ties to an agent and a responsible person — accountability without inspecting the content itself.
Know what your agents touched.
A record of sensitive access — the movement, the asymmetry, the owner.